feat: oauth refresh-token grant + per-runner subdomain TLS plumbing

OAUTH REFRESH-TOKEN
- oauth_tokens.subject column added (migration applied to prod DB): stores
  the JWT sub claim from the original authorization so refreshes can
  re-mint with the same identity without re-walking the (consumed) code.
- Authorization-code branch now writes subject AND uses a 30-day
  expires_at for the row (was 1h — same as access token, which killed
  refresh after 1h).
- New refresh_token grant branch:
    * looks up token by refresh-hash + expiry
    * client_id must match, client_secret verified if confidential
    * RFC 8707: requested resource must equal stored resource
    * OAuth 2.1 rotation: atomic UPDATE WHERE old_hash → new access JWT,
      new refresh token, extended expiry; loser of a race sees invalid_grant
- Access TTL (1h) and refresh TTL (30d) extracted as constants.

Clients no longer have to re-authorize hourly. Closes Zb-001.

PER-RUNNER SUBDOMAIN TLS (Z1-002)
Code path:
- New MCP_DOMAIN env (e.g. "mcp.buildmymcpserver.com") + RUNNER_MAP_DIR
  (default /var/runner-map) in generator config.
- deployContainer: writes /var/runner-map/<slug>.conf with content
  "slug.MCP_DOMAIN port;" and computes publicUrl as
  https://<slug>.<MCP_DOMAIN>. Falls back to http://host:port when
  MCP_DOMAIN is unset (zero behaviour change until host is configured).
- stopContainer (both api/lib/docker.ts and generator/lib/deploy.ts) now
  accepts an optional slug arg and removes the map fragment. Callers
  (DELETE /v1/servers/:id, admin template takedown) updated.

Infra path (one-time host setup — Marco runs as root):
- scripts/setup-runner-tls.sh:
    1. nginx vhost matching *.mcp.buildmymcpserver.com via regex →
       reads slug→port from /opt/buildmymcpserver/runner-map.combined
    2. systemd inotify service watches the map dir, combines fragments
       on any change, reloads nginx
    3. installs inotify-tools if missing, idempotent
- Prereqs documented at top: Cloudflare wildcard DNS proxied, Origin CA
  cert for *.mcp.buildmymcpserver.com, SSL mode Full (strict).
- After running: edit docker-compose.prod.yml to mount the map dir into
  api + generator, set MCP_DOMAIN in env, recreate containers.

Closes Zb-001 fully. Closes Z1-002 on the code side; one Marco-on-host
action away from closing it on the infra side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/api/src/lib/docker.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,43 @@
 import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import path from 'node:path';
+
+/**
+ * Per-runner nginx map fragment cleanup. Mirrors the generator-side helper
+ * (apps/generator/src/lib/deploy.ts) — when MCP_DOMAIN is set, the host
+ * runs an inotify watcher over the map dir that reloads nginx on any
+ * change. We remove the fragment here so the slug stops serving 502 the
+ * moment the user deletes their server.
+ *
+ * No-op if MCP_DOMAIN isn't configured (legacy http://host:port URLs are
+ * still in use). Idempotent — missing files are fine.
+ */
+const MCP_DOMAIN = process.env.MCP_DOMAIN ?? '';
+const RUNNER_MAP_DIR = process.env.RUNNER_MAP_DIR ?? '/var/runner-map';
+
+async function removeRunnerMapEntry(slug: string): Promise<void> {
+  if (!MCP_DOMAIN || !slug) return;
+  try {
+    await fs.rm(path.join(RUNNER_MAP_DIR, `${slug}.conf`), { force: true });
+  } catch {
+    /* ignore — not critical */
+  }
+}
 
 /**
  * Stop and remove a generated MCP container by container id.
  * Resolves regardless of outcome — failures are logged but never blocking.
- * Production: should be moved to a Coolify HTTP-API call.
+ * Also drops the slug's nginx map fragment so the public URL stops 502'ing
+ * the moment the container goes away.
  */
-export async function stopContainer(containerId: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; detail: string }> {
+export async function stopContainer(
+  containerId: string,
+  slug?: string,
+): Promise<{ ok: boolean; detail: string }> {
   if (!containerId || containerId.length < 4) {
     return { ok: false, detail: 'invalid_container_id' };
   }
+  if (slug) await removeRunnerMapEntry(slug);
   return await new Promise<{ ok: boolean; detail: string }>((resolve) => {
     const child = spawn('docker', ['rm', '-f', containerId], {
       stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],

apps/api/src/routes/oauth.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ import { config } from '../config.js';
 
 const db = createDb();
 
+// Access-token lifetime is short so revocation propagates within the hour.
+// Refresh-token lifetime is long so legitimate clients don't have to
+// re-authorize daily; rotation on every refresh limits exposure if one leaks.
+const ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_S = 3600; // 1 hour
+const REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // 30 days
+
 function sha256(input: string): string {
   return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(input).digest('hex');
 }
@@ -236,12 +242,13 @@ export async function oauthRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
         return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_grant' });
       }
 
+      const subject = row.code.userId ?? row.client.clientId;
       const accessToken = await signAccessToken({
-        subject: row.code.userId ?? row.client.clientId,
+        subject,
         audience: resource,
         issuer: `${config.CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_URL}/oauth`,
         scope: row.code.scope ?? '',
-        ttlSeconds: 3600,
+        ttlSeconds: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_S,
       });
       const refreshToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
       await db.insert(oauthTokens).values({
@@ -250,18 +257,98 @@ export async function oauthRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
         refreshTokenHash: sha256(refreshToken),
         scope: row.code.scope ?? null,
         resource,
-        expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 3600 * 1000),
+        subject,
+        // expiresAt is the REFRESH-token lifetime — 30 days. Access-token
+        // expiry lives inside the JWT's `exp` claim (1h, set above).
+        expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_MS),
       });
 
       return reply.send({
         access_token: accessToken,
         token_type: 'Bearer',
-        expires_in: 3600,
+        expires_in: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_S,
         refresh_token: refreshToken,
         scope: row.code.scope ?? '',
       });
     }
 
+    // ─── grant_type: refresh_token ─────────────────────────────────────
+    // OAuth 2.1 with rotation: every successful refresh issues a NEW refresh
+    // token and atomically invalidates the old one. If a stolen refresh token
+    // gets used after the legitimate client refreshed, the second use sees
+    // invalid_grant — that's how rotation surfaces token theft.
+    if (parsed.data.grant_type === 'refresh_token') {
+      const { refresh_token, client_id, client_secret, resource: requestedResource } =
+        parsed.data;
+      if (!refresh_token || !client_id) {
+        return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_request' });
+      }
+
+      const refreshHash = sha256(refresh_token);
+      const [row] = await db
+        .select({ token: oauthTokens, client: oauthClients })
+        .from(oauthTokens)
+        .innerJoin(oauthClients, eq(oauthClients.id, oauthTokens.clientDbId))
+        .where(
+          and(
+            eq(oauthTokens.refreshTokenHash, refreshHash),
+            gt(oauthTokens.expiresAt, new Date()),
+          ),
+        )
+        .limit(1);
+      if (!row) return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_grant' });
+      if (row.client.clientId !== client_id) {
+        return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_client' });
+      }
+      if (row.client.clientSecretHash) {
+        if (!client_secret || sha256(client_secret) !== row.client.clientSecretHash) {
+          return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_client' });
+        }
+      }
+      // RFC 8707: requested resource must equal the stored one — refreshes
+      // don't allow audience changes (would be a downgrade/escalation vector).
+      if (requestedResource && requestedResource !== row.token.resource) {
+        return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_resource' });
+      }
+
+      const subject = row.token.subject ?? row.client.clientId;
+      const newAccessToken = await signAccessToken({
+        subject,
+        audience: row.token.resource ?? '',
+        issuer: `${config.CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_URL}/oauth`,
+        scope: row.token.scope ?? '',
+        ttlSeconds: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_S,
+      });
+      const newRefreshToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
+      const newRefreshHash = sha256(newRefreshToken);
+
+      // Atomic rotation: UPDATE only succeeds if the row still has the OLD
+      // refresh-hash. Two parallel refreshes with the same token can't both
+      // win — the loser sees zero rows and gets invalid_grant.
+      const rotated = await db
+        .update(oauthTokens)
+        .set({
+          accessTokenHash: sha256(newAccessToken),
+          refreshTokenHash: newRefreshHash,
+          expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_MS),
+        })
+        .where(
+          and(eq(oauthTokens.id, row.token.id), eq(oauthTokens.refreshTokenHash, refreshHash)),
+        )
+        .returning({ id: oauthTokens.id });
+      if (rotated.length === 0) {
+        return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_grant' });
+      }
+
+      return reply.send({
+        access_token: newAccessToken,
+        token_type: 'Bearer',
+        expires_in: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_S,
+        refresh_token: newRefreshToken,
+        scope: row.token.scope ?? '',
+      });
+    }
+
     return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'unsupported_grant_type' });
   });
 

apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts

@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ export async function serverRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
     // otherwise it keeps serving traffic with the user's secrets baked in.
     let containerStopped = false;
     if (server.containerId) {
-      const result = await stopContainer(server.containerId);
+      const result = await stopContainer(server.containerId, server.slug);
       containerStopped = result.ok;
       if (!result.ok) {
         app.log.warn(

apps/api/src/routes/templates.ts

@@ -559,12 +559,12 @@ export async function templateRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
     let stoppedContainers = 0;
     if (b.data.status === 'takedown') {
       const forkedServers = await db
-        .select({ id: mcpServers.id, containerId: mcpServers.containerId })
+        .select({ id: mcpServers.id, containerId: mcpServers.containerId, slug: mcpServers.slug })
         .from(mcpServers)
         .where(eq(mcpServers.templateId, p.data.id));
       for (const fork of forkedServers) {
         if (fork.containerId) {
-          const result = await stopContainer(fork.containerId);
+          const result = await stopContainer(fork.containerId, fork.slug);
           if (result.ok) stoppedContainers++;
           else
             app.log.warn(